the correct view is that he is to be detained until he clarifies. Even if he does clarify and the beneficiary of the acknowledgment brands him a liar, the latter must put forward his own clarification and file suit; in any case the acknowledgor’s word prevails when he denies.
If he acknowledges one thousand and on another day again acknowledges one thousand, he is liable for only one. Should the two figures differ, the lesser is subsumed in the greater. Yet if he gives the two sums distinct descriptions, attributes them to two different causes, or says, “I received ten on Saturday,” and later, “I received ten on Sunday,” both amounts become obligatory.
If he says, “I owe you one thousand as the price of wine or of a dog,” or, “I owe you one thousand that I have already paid,” he is still liable for the thousand according to the sounder opinion. If he says, “It is one thousand from the price of a slave I have not yet taken possession of; once he is delivered I shall have been paid,” this qualification is accepted under the relied-upon view and the amount is treated as the purchase price.
If he says, “I owe you one thousand, God willing,” nothing becomes binding according to the authoritative position. By contrast, if he says, “A thousand—yet it is not binding,” the thousand nevertheless becomes due.
Suppose he says, “I owe you one thousand,” then produces the thousand and says, “This is what I meant; it was a deposit,” while the beneficiary retorts, “He owes me another thousand.” According to the sounder view the acknowledgor is believed upon taking an oath. If, however, he had originally phrased it as, “It is on my liability,” or “It is a debt,” the beneficiary is believed under the authoritative position.
I say: Once we allow the interpretation that the sum was a deposit, the sounder opinion is that it counts as a trust; hence, after the acknowledgment we accept his claim that it was lost and his claim that he returned it. If he says, “You have with me” or “in my possession” one thousand, he is categorically believed when he asserts it was a deposit, or that he returned it, or that it was lost. Allah knows best.
If a man acknowledges a sale—or a gift together with delivery—and afterwards says, “It was invalid; I only acknowledged because I thought it valid,” this is not accepted. He may, however, require the beneficiary to swear; should the latter refuse, the acknowledgor swears and is acquitted.
If he says, “This house belongs to Zayd—no, rather to ʿAmr,” or, “I usurped it from Zayd—no, from ʿAmr,” and he has already handed it over to Zayd, the more correct opinion is that the acknowledgor must pay its value to ʿAmr on the strength of his own admission.
An exception clause is valid so long as it is attached immediately and does not nullify the whole. Thus, if he says, “I owe you ten except nine except eight,” nine become obligatory. An exception may also be from a different genus, as in, “I owe you one thousand—except a nūba (a single blow).” He may clarify it by naming a garment worth less than one thousand. An exception from something specified is likewise valid, such as, “This house is his, except for this room,” or, “These dirhams are his, except for this dirham”—though with specified items there is an anomalous opinion.
I also say: If he states, “These slaves belong to him—except for one,” the statement is accepted and the clarification rests with him. Should all of them die except one, and he claims that the survivor is the one he excluded, he is believed on oath according to the sound view. Allah knows best.