The manner of testing varies with a child’s circumstances. The son of a merchant is examined through actual buying, selling, and haggling; the farmer’s son through farming and spending wisely on what sustains it; the artisan’s child in matters connected to his craft; and a girl in spinning, handling cotton, and safeguarding food from cats and the like. The test must be repeated two or more times. Its proper time, according to the stronger view, is before puberty—though some say it is after puberty. On the first view, no contract concluded by the minor is valid; he is only tried in bargaining, and whenever he wishes to finalize a contract the guardian concludes it for him.

If he reaches puberty without sound judgment, the interdiction continues. If he attains puberty together with rushd, the interdiction lapses automatically and his property is handed over to him—although another opinion requires a judge formally to lift the interdiction. Should he squander his wealth thereafter, interdiction is re-imposed; another view holds that it re-attaches automatically without new proceedings. Mere moral corruption, however, does not justify interdiction according to the sound position.

When interdiction is imposed for emergent prodigality, the guardian is the judge; some hold that the guardian is the same person who acted for him in childhood. If insanity later occurs, his guardian is, on the stronger view, the same as in childhood, though others assign guardianship to the judge.

One who is interdicted for wastefulness may not, without his guardian’s permission, sell, buy, manumit, donate, or marry. If he nonetheless purchases goods or borrows money, takes possession, and the property perishes in his hand or he destroys it, no liability falls on him—neither while the interdiction lasts nor after it is lifted—whether or not the other party knew his status. With the guardian’s leave his marriage is valid, but, according to the preponderant view, other financial transactions remain invalid.

His acknowledgement of a debt is void, whether made before or after interdiction; the same, on the dominant opinion, applies to his confession of having destroyed property. His admissions are, however, effective in matters that entail ḥadd penalties or retaliation. Likewise, his divorce, khulʿ, ẓihār, and denial of paternity through liʿān all stand. In acts of worship he is treated like an adult of sound judgment, except that he may not distribute his own zakāh.

When he enters iḥrām for the obligatory Hajj, the guardian hands over sufficient funds to a trustworthy person who will spend on him along the way. If he assumes iḥrām for a voluntary pilgrimage and the travel costs exceed his customary allowance, the guardian is entitled to stop him. The authoritative view is that in such a case he is deemed like a muḥṣar and therefore exits iḥrām.

I say: He may exit iḥrām by fasting if—on the opinion that fasting substitutes for the offering due from a muḥṣar—because he has no access to his wealth. Yet if he can, along the way, earn the exact amount of the excess cost, the guardian may not stop him. Allah knows best.

Section
The guardian (walī) of a minor is first his father, then his grandfather, then the executor appointed by either of them, and then the judge. According to the sound view, the mother does not assume guardianship, and he administers