the pledger to the injured party, and he must pay whichever is less: the slave’s market value or the scheduled compensation for the injury. If the pledgee declines to swear, the oath is then referred to the injured party, not to the pledger; and should the injured party swear, the slave is sold and the proceeds applied to the injury claim.

If the pledger authorises the pledgee to sell the collateral, the pledgee sells it, and thereafter the pledger withdraws his permission saying, “I revoked it before the sale,” while the pledgee replies, “You only revoked it after the sale,” the sounder view is to accept the pledgee’s word.

A debtor who owes two separate sums of 1,000, one of which is secured by a pledge, pays 1,000 and says, “I intended this for the pledged debt.” His statement, confirmed by his oath, is accepted. If he had no particular intention at the time of payment, he may later assign it to whichever debt he prefers; another opinion is that it should be divided proportionally.

Section

When a person dies owing a debt, that debt attaches to his estate just as a pledge binds the pledged item. Another opinion likens it to the way injury compensation attaches to the perpetrator. On the more authoritative view—according to the soundest position—there is no distinction between a debt that exhausts the estate and one that does not.

If an heir disposes of estate property while no debt is apparent, and a debt later emerges because a sale is rescinded for a defect, the stronger opinion is that the heir’s transaction is not automatically rendered invalid; however, if he fails to settle the debt, the transaction is unwound. There is unanimous agreement that the heir may keep the very assets of the estate and pay the debt from his own funds. The correct view is that a debt’s attachment to the estate does not block inheritance, and it does not extend to later accretions to the estate, such as profits or offspring. Allah knows best.