and if he retaliates, the pledge is void. If he waives the offense in return for money, that monetary claim does not take effect according to the sounder view, and the item remains under pledge.

If the pledged slave kills another slave that belongs to the same owner but is pledged to a different creditor, and retaliation is exacted, both pledges become void. If monetary compensation is due, the right of the pledgee of the slain slave attaches to it: the killer slave is sold and the proceeds stand as collateral—some jurists say the slave himself simply becomes the new pledge.

If the two slaves are in the hands of one creditor for a single debt, the security is reduced; and if they are pledged for two separate debts and there is some benefit in transferring the security, it is transferred.

When a pledged article perishes through an unavoidable calamity, the pledge is nullified. It is likewise released if the pledgee rescinds the contract or the debt is cleared; but so long as any part of the debt remains, no portion of the pledge is released.

If half a slave is pledged for one debt and the other half for another, the discharge of one debt frees the corresponding share of the pledge. Likewise, if two people pledge a single slave and one of them is discharged, his share is released.

Section

Should the two parties disagree about the existence of the pledge or its amount, the pledger’s statement—confirmed by his oath—prevails if the pledge was given gratuitously. If it was stipulated as a condition of sale, they both swear.

If the creditor alleges that the two joint owners pledged their slave to him for 100, and only one owner confirms this, the confirming owner’s share is held as collateral for 50, while the second owner’s share remains free on his own sworn statement; the admission of the first owner is effective only against himself.

If they dispute whether possession was ever delivered, then—whether the item is in the pledger’s or the pledgee’s hand—if the pledger says, “You seized it unlawfully,” he is believed on his oath; the same applies if he says, “I handed it over to you for another purpose,” according to the sound view.

If he had earlier acknowledged delivery and later claims, “My acknowledgment was not literal,” he may require the pledgee to swear; another view says he may not do so unless he explains his earlier statement—for example, “I was merely testifying for an administrative record.”

If one of them claims that the pledged property has caused an injury and the other denies it, the denier’s oath prevails. And if the pledger alleges that the injury occurred before the pledgee took possession, the preponderant view is that the pledgee’s denial, backed by his oath, is accepted; yet the sounder opinion is that once he swears, he is still liable to indemnify.