Should the act of emancipation be suspended upon a particular condition, and that condition is fulfilled while the slave is still under pledge, the ruling is the same as what has just been stated; if it is fulfilled only after the pledge has been lifted, it nonetheless takes effect according to the sounder opinion.
Once the pledged item is in the pledgee’s hand, the owner may neither pledge it to a second creditor, nor marry the slave off, nor lease her if the debt is already due or will fall due before the lease ends. He may not have sexual relations with her; if he does, the child is born free. With regard to declaring her an umm walad (istilād), the very same opinions that apply to emancipation apply here as well. If we do not uphold the declaration while the pledge subsists, and the pledge is afterwards released, it then becomes effective on the stronger view. Should she die in childbirth, the owner must pay her value, that value itself becoming the pledge, according to the sounder position.
The pledger is entitled to every usufruct that does not diminish the property—such as riding a pledged animal or living in a pledged house—but not to build on the land or plant trees. If he nevertheless builds or plants, nothing is removed before the debt falls due, nor afterwards if the bare land would not cover the debt and its value is enhanced by the buildings or trees. If the benefit can be had without reclaiming what he built or planted, he may not reclaim it; otherwise he may, and in that case both parties should summon witnesses to avert suspicion. With the pledgee’s permission the pledger may do whatever was earlier forbidden, but the pledgee may revoke that permission before the pledger acts; if the pledger acts unaware of the revocation, his act is treated like that of an agent who did not know he had been dismissed.
If the pledgee authorises the owner to sell the pledged item so that a deferred portion of the debt may be paid from the price, the sale is invalid; the same ruling—according to the more apparent view—applies if he stipulates that the price itself be taken in pledge.
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Once the pledge becomes binding, possession rests with the pledgee and may not be transferred except for the kind of usufruct mentioned above. If the two parties stipulate that the article be held by an impartial custodian, that is allowed; the same applies if they entrust it to two custodians and explicitly state that both are to keep it together or that either may keep it alone. If they leave the matter undefined, neither custodian may take exclusive possession, according to the sounder opinion. Should the custodian die or become disreputable, the parties must agree on another; if they dispute, the judge deposits the pledge with a trustworthy person.
The right to order the sale of the pledged property lies with the judge, and the pledgee has priority with the proceeds. The owner or his agent may sell it only with the pledgee’s consent; if he refuses, the judge tells him, “Either consent or waive the debt.” If the pledgee asks that it be sold and the owner refuses, the judge compels the owner either to pay the debt or sell the article; if he persists, the judge himself sells it. If the pledgee proceeds to sell it