the house, then you are divorced.” In so doing he has made the occurrence of the divorce depend upon the fulfillment of the condition—her entering the house—and that is what is meant by suspension (taʿlīq).

Suspension is valid only when it comes from a husband. If a man were to say, “If I marry her, she is divorced,” and then later marries her, the divorce would not take effect, for at the moment of suspension he was not her husband. This is supported by the hadith transmitted by ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb from his father, from his grandfather, traced back to the Prophet ﷺ: “No vow is binding for the child of Adam regarding what he does not own; no manumission regarding what he does not own; and no divorce regarding what he does not own.” It was recorded by Ahmad, Abū Dāwūd, and al-Tirmidhī, who graded it sound. Allah, Exalted is He, also says, “O you who believe, when you marry believing women and then divorce them…” ⦗Qur’an 33:49⦘. The verse and the hadith together indicate that a divorce directed at a woman who is still a stranger to him does not count—by unanimous agreement if the wording is immediate, and, according to the majority, even if it is suspended upon his later marrying her or the like.

Accordingly, when a divorce is made contingent upon a condition, it does not take place until that condition materializes. Should a doubt arise concerning the divorce—whether about the very utterance of the formula, the number of pronouncements, or the fulfillment of the condition—the ruling is as follows:

1. If he is unsure that he ever uttered the divorce at all, the marriage is not dissolved merely because of that uncertainty; the marriage bond is certain, and certainty is not removed by doubt.

2. If he is unsure whether the condition he attached to the divorce has occurred—such as saying, “If you enter the house, you are divorced,” and then doubting whether she did in fact enter—it likewise does not take effect simply on account of that doubt, for the reason already explained.