There is, moreover, a third opinion advanced by many jurists of our school and by others as well. It states that an explicit textual ruling is to be traced back to an attribute only when the Law itself indicates that the ruling hinges on that attribute; it is not enough that the same attribute has served as the rationale for a parallel or related case.

The difference among the three positions may be summarized as follows: when we find that the Lawgiver has both stipulated a ruling and pointed out its cause—such as his statement concerning the cat, “It is not impure; it is one of those that wander about among you”—that cause is called “textually stated” or “alluded to.” Whether its suitability is obvious to us or not, all three schools agree that the ruling must be applied on its basis, although they disagree over whether this should properly be called analogy (qiyās) or not.

An analogous usage appears in everyday speech. If a master were to say to his servant, “Do not let so-and-so enter my house, for he is an innovator,” or, “for he is black,” the servant understands that no one who is an innovator or who is black is to be admitted. This is equivalent to saying: “Do not allow any innovator or any black person into my house.”

For that reason we apply the same principle in the chapter on oaths. Should someone swear, “I will never wear this garment with which he obliges me,” he would break his oath by wearing any garment through which a comparable favor is conferred upon him—one that imposes a similar obligation, whether from that same person or the like.