—neither sound reason nor revealed law. Hence, whenever people judge something to be beneficial, one must look into the factor that compelled them to it. If that factor is an issue that arose after the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—through no negligence on our part, then it is permissible to introduce whatever the need requires. The same applies when the rationale for such an act existed in the lifetime of the Messenger of Allah, yet he refrained from it because of an impediment that disappeared with his passing.
By contrast, if no new circumstance has arisen to call for it, or if the supposed need stems from the sins of God’s servants, then introducing it is impermissible. Every matter whose motive to act was present during the lifetime of the Messenger of Allah—and which he nonetheless did not legislate—cannot be a true benefit; had it been so, he would have enacted it. Whatever need, however, emerges after his death without involving disobedience to the Creator may indeed be a genuine benefit.
At this point the jurists follow two paths:
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Some hold that such a practice may be carried out so long as it has not been expressly forbidden. This is the view of those who validate the doctrine of unrestricted public interests (maṣāliḥ mursala).
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Others maintain that it may not be undertaken unless there is a positive command, for they do not base legal rulings on maṣāliḥ mursala. These are of two further kinds:
a) Those who refuse to establish a ruling unless it falls under the explicit wording, action, or tacit approval of the Lawgiver himself. These are the deniers of analogical reasoning (qiyās).