Had that benefit not already vanished, it would have remained at his disposal, allowing him to direct it to some other purpose—that is, to employ the very strength with which he performed the act.

Someone might therefore argue: “In that case, the judge should award him the wage if he demands to receive it.”

The reply is: We neither order that it be paid out nor that it be returned, just as we do with the unlawful contracts of non-Muslims. If they accept Islam before taking possession, we do not oblige delivery; and if they embrace Islam after taking possession, we do not command restitution. For a Muslim, however, this wage is forbidden, because he already knew it was prohibited—unlike the non-Muslim.

Thus, when he comes asking for the wage, we say to him: “You were negligent; you expended your effort on something unlawful, so no payment will be adjudicated in your favor.”

But if he has already taken the money and the payer then says, “Have this sum returned to me, for I paid it only in exchange for a prohibited benefit,” we answer: “You handed it over by way of a bargain to which you consented. If you now want to retrieve what you gave, then restore to him what you received—provided that its remaining with you would still be of benefit to him.” The same reasoning applies to any sum received as the price of carrion or wine.

Indeed, when someone buys wine, pays its price, takes possession of it and drinks it, then later asks for his payment back, the sounder view is that the price should be returned to him, even though it remains forbidden for the seller. All the more so because we punish the wine-seller by burning the shop in which wine is sold—a ruling explicitly affirmed by Aḥmad and other scholars—for ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him,