Because of this preponderant benefit—just as in comparable cases—the issue comes to contain four distinct opinions (1).
This disagreement among our scholars, and the wavering over whether the act is merely disliked, applies only when the lease is not contracted for an expressly forbidden use (2). If, however, one rents the premises specifically for selling wine or for turning it into a church or synagogue, then it is unanimously impermissible; this is likewise the position of al-Shāfiʿī and others. It is no different from hiring out one’s male or female slave for fornication, which is also forbidden.
Abū Ḥanīfa, on the other hand, said: “It is permissible to lease it for that purpose” (3).
Abū Bakr al-Rāzī explained: “According to Abū Ḥanīfa there is no distinction between stipulating (4) that wine be sold there and not stipulating it while knowing that wine will in fact be sold there (5); in both cases the lease is valid.”
His rationale is that the lease contract does not obligate the lessee to perform those actions, even if they were stipulated, for he may refrain from selling wine there or making it a church. The rent becomes payable once the property is delivered for the agreed term; since the lessee is not compelled to perform the prohibited acts, mentioning them or omitting them is the same. It is like renting a house in order to sleep or reside in it: the rent is due even if he does neither.
He likewise says (6) about hiring a man to carry (7) wine, a carcass, or a pig: the contract is valid, because carrying the wine itself is not indispensable; indeed, even if he were to carry on it