for the whole community, deeming it distasteful and expressly forbidden. Otherwise it would have become widespread, for whenever an action possesses a compelling motive and faces no counter-force, it inevitably occurs—and the motive is certainly present. Hence we know that a deterrent must also be present, and in this case the deterrent is the religion itself. Thus it is clear that the religion of Islam is what prevents conformity to them, and that is precisely what is required.

Second: We have already mentioned the stipulations set down by ʿUmar—may Allah be pleased with him—agreed upon by the Companions and by all the jurists after them: the People of the Covenant from among the People of the Book are not to display their festivals openly in Muslim lands. They specifically cited Palm Sunday and Easter. If the Muslims have unanimously agreed to prevent them from displaying those festivals, how could it be permissible for Muslims to observe them themselves? Is not a Muslim’s observance of such rites even more blameworthy than a non-Muslim’s public celebration of them?

The only reason we forbade them from publicizing their festivals was the corruption entailed—either because the celebration itself is a sin, or because it is a distinctive emblem of sin. On either count, the Muslim is forbidden both the sin and its emblem. Even if the sole harm in a Muslim’s participation were that it emboldens the unbeliever to flaunt his own festivals—his heart strengthened when he sees a Muslim doing likewise—that would be sufficient to prohibit it. What, then, when the practice contains other evils, some of which we shall soon point out?

Third: There is also the report already cited from Abū al-Shaykh al-Aṣbahānī, narrating from ʿAṭāʾ ibn Yasār