to such an extent that He commands us to introduce a practice whose very performance entails opposing them in matters where conformity had never been part of our conduct nor our intention. How, then, could He not forbid us from carrying out an act that coincides with their practice, whether we mean to imitate them or not?

Fifth consideration: The ruling is linked to the descriptive cause by the particle “fa,” which indicates that the description is, in several respects, the rationale for the ruling. Thus he said: “The Jews and the Christians do not dye their hair, so differ from them.” This makes it clear that the reason for the command to differ is precisely that they do not dye; in other words, “Dye your hair because they do not.” Since their abstention is the cause for our being commanded to perform the act, it follows that the intention to oppose them is legally established, and that is what we sought to prove. Further confirmation lies in this: were the purpose of differing from them to have no influence on the command to dye, the mention of them would be pointless and the ensuing command ill-suited.

Although this shows that differing from them is itself intended by the Law, it does not rule out the presence of an independent benefit in the very act through which they are opposed, irrespective of that opposition. Two considerations are therefore involved:

First: the mere act of differing from them in outward practices is itself a benefit and an advantage for the servants of God, the believers, because such divergence and separation bring about