Whenever the Lawgiver issues a command for an action by using a name that conveys a broad, generic meaning—while actually intending a specific act—the logical ordering we have just explained dictates that, through the first expression, He is aiming at that general meaning, and that He seeks the specific act only because it realizes that meaning.

Thus, in the phrase “Honor him,” two distinct requests are embedded: one is for honoring in the absolute sense, and the other is for the concrete deed through which that absolute honoring is achieved. The attainment of the particular necessarily entails the attainment of the universal. This is a sound principle, and when it meets with a person’s intelligence and insight, he benefits from it in many contexts and comes to understand the proper method of clarification and indication.

One might still say: this demonstrates that the very genus of opposing them is intended by the Lawgiver—and that is indeed correct. Yet the objective of realizing that genus may be fulfilled by opposing them in certain matters; anything beyond that would be superfluous.

I respond: once it is established that the genus is intended in the aggregate, that intention applies to every single instance of it. Even if we were to suppose that obligation lapses in some cases, the ruling of recommendation would still stand for the remainder.

Moreover, this also implies a prohibition against resembling them, for whoever intends