whether he be Arab, non-Arab, or possess any other attribute. What is intended, however, is the unrestricted essence shared by all of these particular cases.

Likewise, when it is said, 'Fear Allah and differ from the Jews,' piety (taqwā) may at times consist in performing an obligatory duty such as prayer or fasting, and at other times in abstaining from a forbidden act such as disbelief (kufr), fornication (zinā), and the like. The presence of a specific action within the scope of taqwā does not exclude other actions from the same scope. Thus, if a man is seen committing fornication and someone says to him, 'Fear Allah,' that statement is a command to adopt taqwā in its comprehensive sense, which necessarily includes ceasing that particular act of fornication, for the occasion that gives rise to a general expression must itself fall under it.

In the same manner, when it is said, 'The Jews and Christians do not dye their beards; therefore differ from them,' the instruction is to differ from them in a broad sense, and included within that breadth is differing from them by dyeing the beard, because that was the circumstance that prompted the general command.

The underlying principle is that the wording conveys both verbal and conceptual generality, and such generality must be upheld. The fact that the command emerged from a specific cause obligates that cause to be included, yet it does not prevent other matters from being included as well. Even if someone were to contend that a general expression should be confined to its cause, in this instance the universality derives from meaning, and therefore it is not susceptible to the kind of restriction that can legitimately qualify a purely verbal generality.