This is really a question of wording; once the underlying concepts are examined, the dispute fades away. What has just been explained is the first side of the matter, namely that an existent thing can never have pure non-existence as its cause.

As for the second side—that an existent thing cannot be the cause of another existence that necessarily entails non-existence—the reason is that sheer non-existence has no need for an actual cause; the mere absence of a cause is enough. Moreover, whenever an existing cause acts, it must produce something, and pure non-existence is not a “something.” An effect that is nothing but non-existence is, in practice, no effect at all. If one speaks of iʿdām (acts of annihilation), such acts are themselves positive realities that include an element of removal: making what exists cease to exist and bringing what is nonexistent into existence are both intelligible. Making the nonexistent “nonexistent,” however, is meaningful only in the sense of leaving it as it already is, and for that mere continuation of non-being the absence of an agent suffices.

There is a clear distinction between the absence of an agent or an efficacious factor—which leads to the absence of a cause—and the idea of a “doer of non-existence,” a “producer of non-existence,” or a “cause of non-existence.” The latter are simply unnecessary; the former is enough.

Both sides of the argument are now evident: pure ʿadam—non-existence unmixed with any trace of being—can never acquire real existence of any kind: not as cause, not as effect, not as agent, and not as that which is acted upon. Likewise, pure and complete wujūd—existence untainted by any trace of non-existence—can never…