criticize him for it and regard the act as a blemish on the man; the public finds it repulsive, and the deed is therefore counted among the breaches of muruʾah (honorable conduct).

Scholars may also differ over the accreditation (taʿdīl) of a particular individual—and this happens often. Look, for example, at al-Tahdhīb, Ibn Ḥajar’s Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, or similar works: you will find that the hadith masters disagree about the very same narrator. One of them will say, “He is a man with nothing objectionable,” another will declare, “He is trustworthy,” while a third will assert, “Strike out his reports; he is of no worth.” When they disagree in this way, what are we to do?

We say: whenever the scholars differ in such a matter—or in any other—we adopt the view that is weightier. If the scholar who validates the narrator knows his circumstances better than the rest, we accept his statement, because he is more familiar with the man’s condition than they are. That is why we maintain that no one truly knows a person’s state except someone who has closely accompanied him. Therefore, if we learn that a certain scholar kept company with the narrator and then described him as upright, we say that he is more knowledgeable than others and we follow his judgment. The same applies if a scholar who was his close companion deems him weak; being the one most familiar with his state, we accept his verdict.

In short, when the hadith masters disagree about accrediting or discrediting a narrator, and one of them is closer to him and better informed about his situation than the other, we defer to the one who is nearer and more knowledgeable. If, however, the two opinions are equal—each scholar being distant from the narrator, or we simply do not know the reality—the scholars themselves have differed: should we give precedence to the accreditation, or to the discrediting?