If, however, he stipulates that he will incur no loss⦗1⦘, or that should the goods find a buyer—otherwise he may return them; or that the purchaser must neither resell, donate, nor emancipate them⦗2⦘; or that, if he does emancipate the slave, its walāʾ (client-relationship) shall revert to the seller; or that he must carry out any of the foregoing—then the condition itself is void, while the sale remains valid.

An exception is where the stipulation is that the slave be set free; in that case the condition stands. Likewise, if he says, “I sell it to you on condition that you hand me the price within three days; otherwise there is no sale between us,” the transaction is sound. By contrast, if he declares, “I sell it to you provided that you bring me such-and-such,” or “provided that Zayd consents,” or if the pledgor says to the pledge-holder, “If I pay you your due, otherwise the pledge is yours,” the sale is invalid.

Should he sell an item while disclaiming liability for every (unknown) defect, the disclaimer does not absolve him. And if he sells a house on the understanding that it measures ten cubits but it turns out to be larger or smaller, the sale is still valid; however, the party who was unaware of the discrepancy and thereby loses his intended benefit retains the option to rescind.