or must it accompany the act even if, chronologically, it comes before it?

Whoever adopts the first view must necessarily conclude that every servant who fails to carry out a command has been charged with what is beyond his capacity, for—on that view—he possesses no ability except alongside the act itself. For this reason, the position affirmed by the soundest theologians, the jurists, the experts in hadith, the Sufis, and others—and explicitly indicated by the Quran—is that the istitaʿah (capacity) upon which commands and prohibitions are based, the capacity that validates moral responsibility, does not have to coincide with the act. By contrast, the istitaʿah whose presence makes the act actually occur is one that does accompany the act.

The first type is exemplified by Allah’s words: “Pilgrimage to the House is a duty owed to Allah by people who are able to find a way to it” (Q 3:97), and by the Prophet’s statement to ʿImrān b. Ḥuṣayn: “Pray standing; if you cannot, then sitting; and if you cannot, then on your side.” It is evident that both the pilgrimage and the prayer remain obligatory upon the one who is able, whether or not he performs them; hence this form of istitaʿah need not be simultaneous with the act.

The second type is found in verses such as: “They were unable to hear, nor could they see” and, “On that Day We shall present Hell, plain to view, to the disbelievers—those whose eyes were veiled from My remembrance and who could not bear to listen” (Q 18:100–101). According to those who interpret istitaʿah here as literal incapacity, these verses refer to this second type. However, according to the early scholars and the majority, what is negated is not physical power but the ease and willingness of the soul: the deed is so onerous and repugnant to them that their souls cannot even will it, though they could carry it out if they chose. This is the state of the person whose whims and corrupt opinions bar him from listening to the revealed books of Allah and following them. Allah describes him as “unable” to do so, and this is the istitaʿah that accompanies—and, in fact, necessitates—the act itself.