slave girls, and that a bondwoman may expose her head and hair ⦗26⦘, he then revisits the question in the light of certain overarching Islamic principles, among them the maxim, “warding off harm takes precedence over securing benefit.” He therefore refuses to leave the ruling unrestricted—an approach that would permit even a comely slave girl to walk about with her hair uncovered—and, after a useful preface, he says:

“Likewise, if there is fear of temptation from a bondwoman, she must veil herself ⦗27⦘.”

He underscores the point, adding:

“If a man were to allow attractive Turkish slave girls to stroll among the people in lands and times such as ours, just as those earlier slave girls used to do, this would be a form of corruption.”

I say: Ibn Taymiyyah’s opinion thus stands midway between the majority—who never require a khimar for the slave girl—and Ibn Hazm and others, who require it of her unconditionally. It is clear that Ibn Taymiyyah adopted this view to reconcile certain reports supporting the majority ⦗26, 33⦘ with the principle mentioned above. Although this view is closer to the truth than that of the majority—which we refuted in The Muslim Woman’s Hijab ⦗42–46⦘—some uneasiness remains: evaluating the beauty that triggers fear of temptation is a relative matter. How many dark-skinned slave women possess such fine features and build that white men are captivated by them, while those same men might feel no attraction, whereas she is considered beautiful by people of her own complexion? The issue lacks a fixed standard. Allah knows best.