with their own taste and the spirit of their times; and if they do not like it, they leave it off, heedless of the fact that they are disobeying his ﷺ command—even on the assumption that it were no more than a recommended act!

I fear that the author’s view comes very close to this position. Otherwise, why did he not address the ruling on growing the beard, despite the abundance of textual evidence related to it—as will be shown—while he did not hesitate to declare a ruling on circumcision, although no explicit text exists concerning it, as he himself previously acknowledged and I answered him? All he offers on the beard is a comment on the Prophet’s ﷺ words, “Let the beards grow…,” saying: “The jurists understood this command to be obligatory and held that shaving the beard is unlawful….” This, however, is not an explicit statement of his own opinion—especially when he knows that neglecting the beard is far more widespread and conspicuous than neglecting circumcision. Many prominent scholars and shaykhs have themselves been tried by this, even taking pride in shaving and beautifying themselves thereby, and some have gone so far as to issue fatwas allowing it—particularly in Egypt, where Sayyid Sabiq and Ustadh al-Samman reside. That fact alone should have compelled him to clarify the ruling on this violation.

I shall therefore seize this opportunity to set out the legal ruling, and I think the best way to do so is to respond to the passage I cited from the book “Purified Islam,” for it is closely connected to the matter at hand. I say:

First: He asserted that the command to grow the beard is merely recommended. We have heard this claim many times from others as well. To refute it I say:

This runs contrary to the established principle in usul al-fiqh that the default status of the Prophet’s ﷺ commands is obligation, in light of Allah’s words: “Let those who oppose his command beware, lest a trial afflict them or a painful punishment” (Quran 24:63), along with other proofs that there is no room to cite here. Departing from this default is permissible only when supported by sound evidence that carries legal weight, and the learned author has produced no such evidence whatsoever.