were lenient in citing ḥadiths dealing with virtues so long as they were not fabricated. It is as though he were saying to them, “If you insist on doing that, then you must confine yourselves to these stipulations.” That is exactly what I myself have done in formulating this principle. Al-Ḥāfiẓ never explicitly declared that he shared their view of permissibility under those conditions—especially since, as we have shown, he signaled at the close of his remarks that he holds the contrary opinion.

In sum, acting upon a weak ḥadīth in matters of virtuous deeds is impermissible according to the weaker interpretation, for it runs counter to the default rule and is unsupported by evidence. Anyone who nonetheless adopts that view must give full consideration to the conditions mentioned and adhere to them in practice. Allah is the One who grants success.

Moreover, one of the detrimental effects of the opinion opposed to ours is that it drags its adherents beyond the sphere of virtues, prompting them to apply it to legal rulings—and even to points of creed. I have many examples of this, but one will suffice. There is a ḥadīth that instructs the worshiper, if he cannot find a screen (sutrah), to draw a line in front of him. Although al-Bayhaqī and al-Nawawī are among those who declared the report weak, they nevertheless permitted acting upon it, in opposition to their own imām, al-Shāfiʿī. Their position will be examined when we discuss that particular ḥadīth.

Whoever desires further clarification and detail on this important subject should consult the introduction to Ṣaḥīḥ al-Targhīb, 1/16–36.