Moreover, these very conditions lend further weight to our earlier conclusion that the majority of scholars never intended the meaning we have just ruled in favor of, for that particular sense requires none of these stipulations, as is plain to see.

It also appears to me that al-Ḥāfiẓ—may Allah have mercy on him—leans toward prohibiting the practice of a weak ḥadīth in the disfavored sense, because he said earlier, “There is no difference between acting upon a ḥadīth in matters of legal rulings or in matters of virtue, for both constitute part of the Sharīʿah.” This is correct, for a weak report that is unsupported by any corroboration may well be a fabrication; indeed, more often than not it is an invented lie, and some scholars have stated this categorically. Such a report is encompassed by the Prophet’s warning, “Whoever relates a ḥadīth from me while he thinks it is false”—that is, while it appears to be false. Hence al-Ḥāfiẓ followed it with the remark, “How much worse, then, for the one who acts upon it!” This is further reinforced by the quotation we previously cited from Ibn Ḥibbān in the eleventh principle: “Anyone who is unsure whether what he relates is sound or unsound falls under that ḥadīth.”

Accordingly, we echo al-Ḥāfiẓ’s own words: “How much worse, then, for the one who acts upon it?!”

This clarifies what al-Ḥāfiẓ meant by his statement. As for the interpretation advanced by one of the contemporary shaykhs of Aleppo—that al-Ḥāfiẓ was speaking only of fabricated reports and that there is no difference in acting upon them in legal rulings or in matters of virtue—such a reading is far removed from the flow of al-Ḥāfiẓ’s words, for he is dealing with weak reports, not fabricated ones, as is perfectly clear.

Nor does our explanation conflict with the fact that al-Ḥāfiẓ laid down conditions for acting upon a weak ḥadīth, contrary to what that shaykh imagined. We say that al-Ḥāfiẓ mentioned those conditions solely for the benefit of the people about whom he reported that they