the remainder; whereas whoever denies any part of it must, by the same reasoning, deny what he has already affirmed—otherwise his position is self-contradictory.

For example, let us say the person addressed affirms for Allah the real attribute of will, yet denies the real attribute of anger and explains anger as either the will to punish or the punishment itself.
He is told: There is no difference between the reality of the will you affirm and the reality of the anger you deny. If affirming real anger necessarily entails likening Allah to His creation, then affirming real will entails the same. And if affirming real will does not entail such likening, then affirming anger does not entail it either, for the rule regarding one attribute is the rule regarding every other. On this basis you are required to affirm them all or deny them all.

Should he object, “The will I affirm does not entail likening, because I mean a will befitting Allah and unlike the will of created beings,” we reply, “Then affirm for Allah an anger that befits Him and is unlike the anger of created beings.”
If he insists, “Anger is the boiling of blood in the heart in pursuit of vengeance, and this is unbefitting of Allah,” we answer, “And will is an inclination of the soul to procure benefit or repel harm, and that too is unbefitting of Allah.”
If he concludes, “That is the will of the creature, whereas the will of Allah befits Him,” we reply, “Likewise, the anger you have just defined is the anger of the creature, whereas the anger of Allah befits Him.”