Taqrib al-Tadmuriyyah - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (36)

Taqrib al-TadmuriyyahIbn al-'Uthaymin

for existence and non-existence stand to each other as pure negation and affirmation—a relationship all rational people acknowledge. When one of the two is removed, the other must necessarily obtain. Hence, if it is said, “He is not existent,” it follows that He is non-existent; and if it is said, “He is not non-existent,” it follows that He is existent. It is therefore impossible to deny them both or to affirm them both at the same time.

Second: Their assertion concerning inanimate objects—that they cannot be characterized by life and death, blindness and sight, hearing and deafness, and the like, whose opposites are simply absence and presence—is nothing more than a terminological convention that does not alter realities. It is refuted by the established fact that Allah can make an inanimate object living, as when He turned Moses’ staff into a living creature that swallowed what the magicians had produced. Allah has also described inanimate idols as dead: “Those whom they invoke besides Allah create nothing, while they themselves are created; dead, not alive, and they do not realize when they will be resurrected” (Qurʾan 16:20–21). Moreover, He has informed us that on the Day of Resurrection the earth will recount its news—namely, every deed of good and evil done upon it—which necessarily implies its hearing what was said and its seeing what was done.

Third: That which is capable of bearing attributes of perfection is more perfect than that which is incapable of them. Consequently, whatever can, in principle, be described with knowledge, power, hearing, and sight—even if it presently lacks them—is superior to what cannot admit such descriptions at all. Your claim that the Lord cannot possibly be described by these perfections entails that He is inferior to a human being who can, for you have likened Him to lifeless matter that is wholly incapable of them.

Fourth: If it is impossible for both existence and non-existence to be absent, then it is even more impossible for a thing to be incapable of accepting either of them. On this basis, their statement that the Lord cannot be described in terms of existence or non-existence necessarily likens Him to the most impossible of impossibilities.

تقابلهما تقابل سلب وإيجاب باتفاق العقلاء، فإذا انتفى أحدهما لزم ثبوت الآخر، فإذا قيل ليس بموجود، لزم أن يكون معدوماً، وإذا قيل ليس بمعدوم لزم أن يكون موجوداً، فلا يمكن نفيهما معاً ولا إثباتهما معاً. الوجه الثاني: أن قولهم في الجماد: إنه لا يقبل الاتصاف بالحياة، والموت، والعمى، والبصر، والسمع، والصمم ... ونحوها مما يكون تقابله تقابل عدم، وملكه قول اصطلاحي لا يغير الحقائق، مردود بما ثبت من جعل الجماد حياً، كما جعل الله عصا موسى حية تلقف ما صنعه السحرة، وقد وصف الله تعالى الجماد بأنه ميت في قوله: ﴿وَالَّذِينَ يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ لا يَخْلُقُونَ شَيْئاً وَهُمْ يُخْلَقُونَ، أَمْوَاتٌ غَيْرُ أَحْيَاءٍ وَمَا يَشْعُرُونَ أَيَّانَ يُبْعَثُونَ﴾ [النحل: ٢٠ – ٢١] . وأخبر أن الأرض يوم القيامة تحدث أخبارها - وهي ما عمل عليها من خير وشر - وهذا يستلزم سمعها لما قيل ورؤيتها لما فعل. الوجه الثالث: أن الذي يقبل الاتصاف بالكمال أكمل من الذي لا يقبله، فما يقبل أن يوصف بالعلم، والقدرة، والسمع، والبصر - ولو كان خالياً منه - أكمل مما لا يقبل ذلك، فقولكم إن الرب لا يقبل أن يتصف بذلك يستلزم أن يكون أنقص من الإنسان القابل لذلك حيث شبهتموه بالجماد الذي لا يقبله. الوجه الرابع: أنه إذا كان يمتنع انتفاء الوجود والعدم، فانتفاء عدم قبول ذلك أشد، وعلى هذا يكون قولهم: إن الرب لا يقبل الاتصاف بالوجود والعدم مستلزماً لتشبيهه بأشد الممتنعات.