Thus, in the realm of existence there are only two kinds of beings:
- One that is eternal, necessarily existent in and of Himself.
- Another that is originated, contingent in its existence, and depends on something else for its being.
The mere fact that both are called “existent” does not mean they share the same properties, for the existence that belongs to the Necessary Being is unique to Him, while the existence that belongs to what is originated is unique to it:
• The Creator’s existence is necessary, eternal, impossible to come into being, everlasting, and impossible to cease.
• The creature’s existence is possible, brought into being after non-existence, and liable to vanish.
Whoever refuses to acknowledge both their points of similarity and their points of difference must conclude that all existents are either (a) eternal and necessarily existent in themselves, or (b) originated and contingent, existing through another. Both alternatives are, by self-evident necessity, patently false.¹
Third: Their refusal to affirm or deny attributes leads to the negation of two contraries at once—an impossibility, for contraries can neither coexist nor both be absent; one of them must be present. Consequently, by their own reasoning they liken Allah to impossibilities, for it is impossible for a thing to be neither existent nor non-existent, neither living nor dead, except as a mere construct of the mind with no reality whatsoever. To describe Allah, exalted be He, in this fashion—besides flatly contradicting what sound reason knows by instinct—is an explicit act of disbelief in what the Messenger brought.
If they argue, “The joint negation of two contraries is impossible only in something capable of possessing them; but in what is not capable of them—such as inanimate matter, which cannot be described as hearing or deaf—both may be denied, so one may say: it is neither hearing nor deaf,”
we reply: The answer has four parts.
First: What they have claimed cannot stand with respect to denying existence and non-existence, for