For example, consider the mercy that Allah has affirmed for Himself in the verses, “And your Lord is the All-Forgiving, the Possessor of mercy” (18:58) and, “He is the All-Forgiving, the Merciful” (10:107). This mercy can be proven rationally just as it is proven textually. One may argue: beneficence toward created beings—granting them benefit and shielding them from harm—testifies to mercy just as particularization testifies to will; indeed, it is even clearer, for its evidence is plain to everyone.
Third: Even on the assumption that reason does not indicate the attributes you have denied, the absence of a given rational proof does not imply that the attribute itself is nonexistent. The failure of one specific proof does not negate the thing proved, for it may be established by another line of evidence. Thus, if we suppose that reason does not confirm the attribute, the textual proofs certainly do; in that case, the attribute must be affirmed on the basis of the sound, unopposed evidence.
If they object, “Rather, reason proves that the attribute is absent, because affirming it would entail resemblance, and reason proves the impossibility of resemblance,” we reply: If affirming it really entailed resemblance, then affirming the very attributes you yourselves acknowledge would also entail resemblance. If you deny that consequence for the attributes you affirm, the same denial applies to the ones you reject, for there is no distinction between them.
You are therefore faced with two consistent courses of action: either affirm all the attributes and agree with the early generations (the salaf), or negate them all and side with the Muʿtazila and those who follow their path. Any attempt to differentiate between the two sets of attributes is an obvious contradiction.