Ibn al-Qayyim alluded to this point in Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl, noting that Adam’s appeal to the divine decree neither dismissed a rightful claim nor served as proof for falsehood; hence there is no objection to citing destiny in such a context. The appeal that is harmful, however, concerns the present or the future: a person commits a prohibited act or neglects a duty, is rebuked, and then invokes qadar to justify persisting in it. In doing so he invalidates a rightful demand and commits a wrong—just as the obstinate idolaters pleaded, “Had Allah willed, neither we nor our fathers would have associated partners with Him” (al-Anʿām 148) and “Had the Most Merciful willed, we would not have worshipped them” (az-Zukhruf 20). They cited destiny to vindicate their practice, feeling no remorse, making no resolve to abandon it, and refusing to acknowledge its corruption. This is the very opposite of someone who recognizes his mistake, repents, and is firmly determined never to return…

The crux of the matter is that when blame has been lifted, invoking the divine decree is valid; but when blame is still due, such an appeal is invalid. Ibn al-Qayyim then cited the report about ʿAlī—may Allah honor him—when the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, came to him and Fāṭimah at night and said, “Will you not rise to pray?” Ibn al-Qayyim maintained that ʿAlī’s plea of qadar was sound—and that the Prophet therefore did not censure him[1]—for a sleeper is not negligent, and the appeal to destiny by one who has not been negligent is acceptable.