the mere negation of resemblance. It is plain that such a basis cannot be trusted; rather, reliance must be placed on what revelation and sound reason alike attest to—namely, that Allah is described by attributes of unblemished perfection. Accordingly, anything that conflicts with the divinely-established attributes of perfection is impossible for Him, for the affirmation of one of two opposites automatically negates the other and everything that proceeds from it.
By this standard we can rebut what that pretender has ascribed to Allah of deficient qualities. We say: sorrow, weeping, hunger, and thirst are traits of imperfection that contradict His perfection and are therefore negated of Allah. Likewise, eating and drinking entail need, and need is a defect; whatever entails a defect is itself defective. The liver, stomach, and intestines are instruments for eating and drinking, so the One who is exalted above eating and drinking is, by that very fact, exalted above the instruments that serve them.
As for joy, laughter, anger, and the like, these are attributes of perfection containing no deficiency, so they are not denied of Him; yet they in no way resemble what the creature experiences. Exalted is He—there is no equal, no namesake, no peer. It is therefore impossible that the reality of His essence mirror the essence of any created being, or that the reality of any of His attributes mirror the attributes of the creation, for He does not belong to the genus of created things: not the angels, nor humanity, nor the heavens, nor the celestial bodies, nor the air, nor the earth, nor anything else.
Indeed, one must realize that His reality resembling that of any existing thing is further removed than any other imagined likeness. If two realities were identical, whatever is possible for one would be possible for the other, whatever is obligatory for one would be obligatory for the other, and whatever is impossible for one would be impossible for the other. Consequently, what is possible for the Creator, who exists necessarily through Himself, would be possible for the contingent creature, and the creature would share in what is unique to the Creator—so that the very same entity would be simultaneously necessary-in-itself and not necessary-in-itself, existent and nonexistent. That is an impossible union of two contradictories.