they are as insubstantial as moonbeams. Likewise, when a ḥadīth happens to support his own school of law he is no more eager to investigate it, fearing that its weakness might become evident; instead, he is satisfied to declare it authentic on the basis of whatever statement he finds, even when that statement contravenes the established rules of ḥadīth criticism.

In sum, this ḥadīth is sound according to the Shaykh’s own methodology. For our purposes, it suffices that it functions as a second corroborating report for the ḥadīth of Anas—even though its chain contains the same issues found in the first corroborating narration. The Shaykh’s verdict of weakness is therefore manifestly wrong in every respect, for the very least that can be said is that the ḥadīth is ḥasan li-ghayrihi (acceptable owing to corroboration).

4 – The legal implication of this ḥadīth is identical to that of Anas’s report.

As for the Shaykh’s assertion that, even if the ḥadīth were authentic, it would furnish no proof—because the text does not state that the man set out after dawn, mounted his ride, and then ate, so that it remains possible he left his house before daybreak—I reply: this conjecture is untenable for several reasons.

First, it contradicts the most immediate sense conveyed by the ḥadīth.