the proof from converse implication (dalīl al-khitāb) as well. The scholars have answered him on this, most notably Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah in several places of his Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā; see volume two of its index.

Our discussion of ʿĀʾishah’s ḥadith concerning listening to singing has been lengthy, yet there is no harm in that, God willing, for the point of evidence is both clear and important: when a student of knowledge notices the Prophet’s ﷺ tacit approval of a matter, that awareness opens for him a door of jurisprudential insight and understanding that he would not have reached otherwise. The same occurred in the report of the Badr well.

In sum, Ibn Ḥazm’s mistake arose from his imagining that the Prophet ﷺ repudiated Abu Bakr’s objection to the two girls without qualification, rather than from his own approval of the girls. That approval, as already explained, indicates only a permission restricted to the day of ʿĪd, to the duff rather than every musical instrument, and to young girls in particular, as the scholars have stated. Ibn al-Jawzī says in Talbīs Iblīs 1/239:

‘What appears concerning these two girls is that they were of tender age, for ʿĀʾishah herself was young and the Messenger of Allah ﷺ used to send her young slave-girls who would play with her.’1

For this reason, I do not think that Ibn Ḥazm would have generalized the ruling were it not for that misunderstanding; what supports this view is the aforementioned report about sending the girls, for he adopted its specific indication and did not generalize it. He said in al-Muḥallā 10/75–76:

‘It is permissible exclusively for young girls to play with images, and it is not lawful for anyone else…’

I say: This is precisely the sound juristic method that results from reconciling the texts, treating the specific as a qualifier for the general.