champion a view whose invalidity is common knowledge—such as wiping over the feet in ablution—we discipline them, censure them, and oblige them categorically to wash.

Al-Ustadh Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayini said: The majority maintain that those who reject qiyas (analogical reasoning) do not attain the rank of ijtihad and may not be entrusted with the judiciary (1).

Al-Ustadh Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi transmitted from Abu ʿAli ibn Abi Hurayrah and a group of Shafiʿis that no weight is given to the dissent of Dawud and the other deniers of qiyas in subsidiary rulings, though not in foundational principles.

Imam al-Harameyn Abu l-Maʿali stated—and this is the position adopted by the critical scholars—that those who repudiate qiyas are not counted among the scholars of the ummah or the custodians of the Sacred Law, for they stubbornly contest something established by widespread and mutawātir transmission. Indeed, most of the Shariʿah rests on ijtihad, while the textual proofs do not cover even a tenth of its breadth; such people, therefore, revert to the status of laymen.

I say: Imam Abu l-Maʿali’s position is the outcome of his own ijtihad, just as their negation of qiyas stems from theirs. How, then, can one ijtihad be rejected by another? We know with certainty that Dawud used to teach his school, debate in its defense, and issue fatwas according to it in Baghdad itself, despite the great number of leading jurists there and elsewhere. Yet we never saw them rise against him, object to his verdicts or his teaching, or strive to prevent him from disseminating his views—while scholars of the highest standing were present, such as Ismaʿil the Qadi, the senior Maliki; ʿUthman ibn Bashshar al-Anmati, the head of the Shafiʿis; al-Marwazi, the chief of the Hanbalis; the two sons of Imam Ahmad; Abu l-ʿAbbas Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Barti (2), the leading Hanafi; Ahmad ibn Abi ʿImran the judge; and other scholars of comparable stature.