its underlying principles, and he undertook an abridgment of Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Muḥallā (1), one of the great works of jurisprudence. He also produced a number of books and monographs on legal questions, and scattered throughout his writings are reflections, opinions, and critiques—such as his treatment of the rulings on divorce and his debate with Ibn Taymiyyah (2).

Like the other Hanbali scholars, he regarded the Quran and the hadith as the bedrock of fiqh. Al-Dhahabī’s own conception of jurisprudence is made plain in two lines of verse that many of his biographers have cited:

Jurisprudence is: “Allah has spoken, His Messenger has spoken”—
If the report is sound, and there is consensus, strive therein.
Beware of setting up, out of ignorance, a conflict
Between the Prophet and a jurist’s opinion. (3)

What has been said does not imply that al-Dhahabī lacked knowledge of fiqh; rather, he kept some distance from it because he was absorbed in hadith and its transmission, the second source of law after the Noble Book. Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn (d. 842 AH) remarked, “He was well trained in the schools of the Imams and the views of doctrinal writers, standing among the later generations to spread the Sunnah and the creed of the early predecessors.” (4)

Measured against the era in which he lived, al-Dhahabī’s prose is of high quality, and it is enough to note that slips of grammar are rarely found in his works. As a leading hadith scholar and an accomplished critic, he is meticulous in his wording, an essential trait for selecting the right expression and placing it precisely where it belongs—especially when crafting biographical entries. Added to this is his smooth, engaging style, which rewards those who habitually read such literature.