in one of the towering mountains.

(1) ʿUmar ibn Wājib related to me about him, saying: “While we were sitting with the shaykh in Valencia and he was teaching the school of law, Abū Muḥammad ibn Ḥazm happened to overhear us and was astonished. He then put a question of jurisprudence to those present; when they replied, he objected to their answer. One of the attendees retorted, ‘This branch of knowledge is not one of your inventions!’ At that, he rose and withdrew to his house, secluded himself, and a torrent poured forth from him that did not cease. (2) Only a few short months later we returned to that very place, and he engaged in a most admirable debate, during which he declared: ‘I pursue the truth, exert myself in ijtihād, and do not bind myself to any particular school.’ (3)”

I say: Yes indeed, whoever attains the rank of ijtihād and has that confirmed by a number (4) of leading scholars is no longer permitted to practice taqlīd. By the same token, the novice jurist and the ordinary Muslim who merely memorises the Qur’an—or even a large portion of it—are never allowed to engage in ijtihād. How could such a person exercise independent reasoning? What would he say? Upon what foundation would he build? How can one hope to fly when his feathers have not yet grown?

The third category is the accomplished, alert, perceptive jurist-traditionist who has memorised an abridgement of the branches of law, a work on the principles, studied grammar, taken part in the ancillary disciplines, memorised the Book of Allah, busied himself with its exegesis, and possesses strong powers of debate. This is the level of restricted ijtihād: he is qualified to examine the proofs of the imams. Whenever the truth in a particular issue becomes clear to him, the textual evidence is established, and one of the eminent imams—such as Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik, al-Thawrī, al-Awzāʿī, al-Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbayd, Aḥmad, or Isḥāq—has acted upon it, then let him follow that truth, avoid seeking concessions, and be scrupulous; once the proof has been established, simple imitation is no longer permissible for him in that matter.

If he fears anyone—