Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (2/288)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

then, if it arises again, he is not required to repeat the investigation and deliberation; rather, he may rely on the first conclusion, unless there is some reason to reconsider it.

“And he prays according to the second determination and does not make up what he prayed according to the first. Among them is the intention …”

His statement, “And he prays according to the second determination and does not make up what he prayed according to the first”: “he prays” means the independent jurist, “according to the second” means according to his second independent determination, and “he does not make up what he prayed according to the first” means when his error becomes clear to him. This is because the first determination was based on independent reasoning, through which a person fulfilled what was required of him. Whoever fulfills what is required of him is not obliged to repeat the act of worship; for if we were to say that repetition were obligatory, we would require him to perform the act of worship twice.

Thus, if he prayed the noon prayer facing north, believing on the basis of his independent reasoning that this was the qiblah, then at the time of the afternoon prayer it becomes clear to him that the qiblah lies to the south, he does not repeat the noon prayer. He prayed it on the basis of independent reasoning, as he had been commanded to do, and one independent determination is not overturned by another.

The same applies to scholarly issues. If a person held a view because he believed it to be indicated by the texts, then, after research, deliberation, and further study, it becomes clear to him that the matter is contrary to his first view, he is not required to overturn a judgment if he had issued one on that basis, nor to retract the legal verdict. He is not required to go to the person to whom he gave the first verdict and say, “I gave you such-and-such a verdict, but it has become clear to me that I was mistaken.” This is because the first ruling resulted from independent reasoning, and so it is not overturned by the second independent determination.

We say that it is not overturned because, just as error was possible in his first independent determination, error is also possible in the second. The first may in fact be correct, even though he thinks that the second is correct. For this reason, the scholars said: one independent determination is not overturned by another.

ثم حدثت مرَّة أخرى فإنه لا يلزمه أن يُعيد البحث والمناقشة، بل يكتفي بالأوَّل ما لم يكن هناك سبب لإعادة النَّظر. وَيُصَلِّي بالثَّانِي، وَلَا يَقْضِي ما صَلَّى بالأوَّلِ وَمِنْهَا النِّيَّةُ .... قوله: «وَيُصَلِّي بالثَّانِي، وَلَا يَقْضِي ما صَلَّى بالأَوَّلِ»، «يُصلِّي» أي: المجتهد «بالثاني»، أي: بالاجتهاد الثاني «ولا يقضي ما صَلَّى بالأول» أي: إذا تبيَّن له خطؤه؛ لأن الأول مبنيٌّ على اجتهاد قد أتى الإنسان بما يجب عليه فيه، ومن أتى بما يجب عليه لم يُلزم بإعادة العبادة، لأننا لو قلنا بلزوم الإعادة لأوجبنا عليه العبادة مرَّتين. فإذا صَلَّى الظُّهر إلى الشمال معتقداً بحسب اجتهاده أن هذه هي القِبْلة، وفي العصر تبيَّن له أن القِبْلة نحو الجنوب فلا يُعيد الظُّهر؛ لأنه صلاَّها باجتهاد حسب ما أُمِرَ، والاجتهاد لا يُنقض باجتهاد ومثله: المسائل العِلميَّة، لو كان الإنسان يرى رأياً بناءً على أن هذا مقتضى النُّصوص، ثم بعد البحث والمناقشة والاطِّلاع تبيَّن له خلاف رأيه الأول، فإنه لا يلزمه نقض الحكم إن كان حاكماً به، ولا نقض الفتوى، فلا يلزمه أن يذهب إلى الذي أفتاه في الأول، ويقول: إني أفتيتك بكذا وتبيَّن لي أني أخطأت. لأنَّ الأول صادر عن اجتهاد، فلا يُنقض بالاجتهاد الثاني. وإنما قلنا: لا يُنقض؛ لأنه كما كان الخطأ في اجتهاده الأول يمكن أن يكون الخطأ في الثاني، فربما يكون الأول هو الصَّواب؛ وقد ظَنَّ أنَّ الثاني هو الصَّواب فلهذا قالوا: لا يُنقض الاجتهاد بالاجتهاد.