a trustworthy person, and he did what was required of him. Whoever does what is required of him does not have to repeat the prayer, just as when a mufti gives him a legal verdict and it later becomes clear that the mufti was mistaken in it.

To summarize the issue:

First: Whoever prays on the basis of independent reasoning, his prayer is valid, whether he was mistaken or correct, and whether he is travelling or settled, according to the stronger view.

Second: If he prays without independent reasoning or following another’s judgment, then if he was mistaken, he must repeat the prayer; but if he was correct, he does not have to repeat it, according to the correct view.

His statement, “if he finds someone to follow,” indicates that if he does not find anyone to follow and makes a careful determination, he does not have to repeat the prayer.

The one who knows the indicators of the qiblah must exercise independent reasoning for every prayer, ...........

His statement, “The one who knows the indicators of the qiblah must exercise independent reasoning for every prayer”: the one who knows the indicators of the qiblah is the independent jurist. He is so called because, through his knowledge of the indicators of the qiblah, he is qualified to exercise independent reasoning. Thus, he is required to exercise independent reasoning for every prayer. For example, if he determines the direction for the noon prayer and concludes that the qiblah is in front of him, marks its direction, and prays, then his prayer is valid. But when the afternoon prayer comes, he may not rely on his first determination; rather, he must determine it anew and reconsider the indicators. Thus, each prayer requires a separate determination, due to the possibility of error in the first determination. However, this view too is weak.

The correct view is that he is not required to exercise independent reasoning for every prayer unless there is some reason to do so, such as a doubt arising concerning his first determination. In that case, he should reconsider it, whether the doubt was prompted by someone else or arose within himself.

A similar case is that of the independent jurist in scholarly matters: if, for example, he investigates an issue, exercises independent reasoning concerning it, and concludes that its ruling is such and such;