Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

The second case is when he says, “I pledged it as collateral and delivered possession.” We say regarding this what we said concerning a gift. Why did he acknowledge delivery of possession? Because, according to the well-known view in the madhhab, a pledge is not binding until possession is taken—whether by the pledgee or by someone acting in his place. For example, if the two parties agree to place it with a third person—what the jurists call an ʿadl (custodian)—the matter is clear.

The point is that he acknowledged that he had pledged his car and delivered it. Thus, he acknowledged a binding pledge. Then the pledgee says, “I have taken possession of the car, and the pledge is binding.” But the one who made the acknowledgment says, “I did not deliver it to you.” The pledgee says, “Did you not acknowledge it?” He replies, “Yes, I acknowledged that I pledged it to you and delivered it to you, but I now deny having delivered possession.”

Should we say that his denial is not accepted because it overturns his initial acknowledgment, or should we say that it is accepted? We say that it is accepted, because this is possible: he may acknowledge both the pledge and delivery of possession in order for the contract to be completed, when no delivery of possession actually took place.

In any event, the pledgee claims that the pledge is binding, while the pledgor says, “I did not deliver it to you, so the pledge is not binding.” If the one who made the acknowledgment says, “Swear that I delivered it to you,” and he swears, then the pledge becomes binding and he is deemed to have taken possession. But if he refuses to swear, the oath is returned to the pledgor—the one who claimed that he had acknowledged delivery and then denied it. We say to him, “Swear that you did not deliver it to him.” If he swears, the pledge is not binding, because it is a pledge of which possession was not taken.

We have previously stated that the stronger view is that taking possession is not a condition for a pledge; rather, it becomes binding upon specification, whether possession is taken or not. This has been the practice of judges for ages: a person pledges his car to someone while continuing to use it and keep it in his possession; or he pledges his farm while continuing to work on it; or he pledges his house while continuing to live in it.

The third case is: “Or he acknowledges receipt of a price or something else.” He sold him his house

الثانية: يقول: «رهن وأقبض» نقول فيها مثل الهبة، ولماذا أقر بالإقباض؟ لأن الرهن على المشهور من المذهب لا يلزم إلا بالقبض، يقبضه المرتهن، أو من يقوم مقامه، مثل لو اتفقا على أن يجعلاه عند رجل ـ وهو ما يعرف عند الفقهاء بالعدل ـ فالأمر ظاهر، المهم أقر بأنه رهن سيارته وأقبضها، إذن أقر برهن لازم، ثم إن المرتهن قال: أنا قابض السيارة والرهن لازم، فقال المقر: إنني لم أقبضك إياها، فقال: ألم تكن قد أقررت؟ قال: بلى، أقررت بأني رهنتك وأقبضتك، لكن الآن أنكرت الإقباض، فهل نقول: إن إنكاره غير مقبول؛ لأنه يرفع إقراره الأول، أو نقول: إنه مقبول؟ نقول: إنه مقبول؛ لأن الأمر ممكن، فقد يُقر بالرهن والإقباض من أجل أن يتم العقد، والإقباض لم يكن، وعلى كل حال، فالمرتهن يطالب بأن الرهن لازم؛ والراهن يقول: لم أقبضك فالرهن غير لازم، فإذا قال المقر: احلف أنني قد أقبضتك إياه فحلف، يلزم الرهن ويكون قابضاً، فإن أبى أن يحلف ترد اليمين على الراهن الذي ادعى أنه الذي أقر بأنه أقبض ثم أنكر، نقول: احلف أنك لم تقبضه فحلف، فلا يلزم الرهن؛ لأنه رهنٌ غير مقبوض، وقد سبق لنا أن القول الراجح: أن الرهن لا يشترط قبضه، وأنه يلزم بالتعيين، سواء قبض أم لم يقبض، وأن العمل عند القضاة منذ أزمنة على هذا، يرهن الإنسان سيارته لشخص وهو يستخدمها تحت يده، أو يرهن فلاحته وهو يشتغل فيها، أو يرهن بيته وهو ساكن فيه. المسألة الثالثة: «أو أقر بقبض ثمن أو غيره» باع عليه بيته

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