Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (15/470)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

Thus, with respect to retaliation, the judgment is overturned because of its gravity and seriousness; whereas with respect to the financial liability—namely, the blood money—it is not overturned. This is what led me to say that retraction may occur either before judgment, or after judgment but before enforcement, or after enforcement. The ruling differs when the witnesses retract after judgment but before retaliation has been carried out. If they testify to something entailing retaliation and then retract—even after judgment—retaliation is not carried out. However, blood money for that limb, concerning which they testified that retaliation was due, becomes binding.

His statement, “They are liable for compensation,” means that the two witnesses are liable in a case where judgment is issued on the basis of their testimony: if it concerns property, their liability is financial; and if it concerns something other than property, their liability is of the corresponding kind. But if they retract before judgment in a case of retaliation, they bear no liability. If they retract after retaliation has been carried out, retaliation is carried out against them—provided that they say, “We did so deliberately in order that this man’s hand be cut off.” In that case, retaliation is carried out against them, and their hands are cut off.

Accordingly, if witnesses in a property case retract before judgment, there is neither judgment nor liability. If they retract after judgment but before enforcement, the judgment stands and they are liable for compensation; the holder of the right takes from them, not from the person against whom judgment was issued. If they retract after judgment and enforcement, the judgment is not overturned, and they are liable for compensation. In this case, the one who holds them liable is the person against whom judgment was issued, because the holder of the right has already received his due.

His statement, “not those who declared them trustworthy,” means that those who attested to the witnesses’ trustworthiness are not liable, because the direct cause of the loss or liability is the witnesses themselves. Thus, those who declared them trustworthy say: “We do not testify to this matter; rather, we merely declare the witnesses trustworthy.” For example, Zayd claims

آخر، فمن جهة القصاص ينقض لعظمه وخطره، ومن جهة المال التي هي الدية لا ينقض، وهذا هو الذي جعلني أقول: إن الرجوع إما أن يكون قبل الحكم، أو بعده، وقبل الاستيفاء، أو بعد الاستيفاء، والذي يختلف فيه الحكم فيما إذا رجعا بعد الحكم وقبل استيفاء القصاص، فإذا شهدا بما يوجب القصاص ثم رجعا ولو بعد الحكم فلا قصاص، لكن تلزم دية ذلك العضو الذي شهدا بأنه مستحق في القصاص. وقوله: «ويلزمهم الضمان» يعني يلزم الشاهدين الضمان في الحال التي يحكم فيها، إن كان مالاً فمال، وإن كان غير مال فغير مال، لكن إذا رجعا قبل الحكم في القصاص فإنه لا ضمان، وإذا رجعا بعد الاستيفاء في القصاص فإنه يقتص منهما، لكن بشرط أن يقولا: عَمَدْنا ذلك لتقص يد هذا الرجل، فحينئذٍ يقتص منهما، فتقص أيديهما. إذاً إذا رجع شهود المال قبل الحكم فلا حكم ولا ضمان، وإذا رجعوا بعد الحكم وقبل الاستيفاء ثبت الحكم وعليهم الضمان، وصاحب الحق يأخذ منهم، لا ممن حكم عليه، وإذا رجعوا بعد الحكم والاستيفاء فالحكم لا ينقض، وعليهم الضمان والذي يضمِّنهم في هذه الحال المحكوم عليه؛ لأن صاحب الحق استوفى حقه. وقوله: «دون من زكاهم» يعني أما من زكى الشهود فلا يضمن؛ لأن المباشر للتلف أو الغرم الشهود، ولهذا فالمزكون يقولون: نحن لا نشهد بهذا لكن نزكي الشهود، مثاله: ادعى زيد