and the presumption is that the cause remains and has not ceased. Thus, this condition requires one of three things: that the original witness request someone to bear witness, that it be heard before the judge, or that he attribute it to a cause.

His statement, “from a loan,” means that the secondary witness hears the original witness say: “I testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one thousand dirhams as a loan,” and then the witness dies. May the one who heard him testify on the basis of his testimony? The answer is yes, because he attributed it to a cause, saying, “as a loan.”

His statement, “or a sale,” is like his saying: “I testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one thousand dirhams as the price of a camel.” This is permissible, because he attributed it to a cause.

His statement, “or the like,” is like his saying: “I testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one thousand dirhams as rent for a house.” This is permissible.

His statement, “If witnesses concerning property retract after judgment has been issued, it is not overturned, and they are liable for compensation, rather than those who declared them reliable”: if the witnesses concerning property—that is, those who testified that one person was owed property by another—retract after having testified, then this can only be either before judgment or after judgment. There is also a third situation: after the judgment has been executed. Thus, there are three cases:

The first is when they retract before judgment. They then bear no liability, and no judgment is issued on the basis of their testimony. For example, Zayd claims ten thousand riyals from ʿAmr and brings two witnesses before the judge. When the judge is about to record their testimony, they retract, as though they had been false witnesses but, upon realizing the gravity of the matter, withdrew their testimony before the judge issued judgment. They then say, for example: