if it is conveyed by one secondary witness from two original witnesses—for example, Ḥajjāj testifies concerning ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Khalīl—then we do not rule on the basis of this testimony, because he is only one person. It has also been said that it is permissible, because secondary testimony is a report and not original testimony. Thus, for example, Ḥajjāj says, “ʿAbd al-Raḥmān informed me, and Khalīl informed me, that they testify that so-and-so owes such-and-such to so-and-so.” They say that judgment may then be given on its basis, but there remains some reservation about this.

The possible scenarios are therefore four:

The first: two secondary witnesses concerning two original witnesses, one secondary witness for each original witness.

The second: two secondary witnesses concerning two original witnesses, both secondary witnesses testifying concerning each of them.

The third: one secondary witness concerning two original witnesses. There is disagreement concerning this, but the school holds that it is not permissible, and this is the stronger view.

The fourth: two secondary witnesses for each original witness; this is permissible all the more so.

His statement, “Or he hears him acknowledge it before the judge,” means that hearing the original witness testify to it before the judge takes the place of requesting someone to bear witness. Thus, if the secondary witness hears the original witness testify to it before the judge, he may testify, even if the original witness did not ask him to bear witness. This is possible, as when Zayd brings a claim against ʿAmr, and the judge asks Zayd for evidence. Zayd then brings a witness before the judge, who testifies that ʿAmr owes Zayd such-and-such. Another man is present, but the judge does not give judgment; the two litigants depart, and the witness then dies or disappears. May the one who heard him testify to it before the judge himself testify? The author says: yes. If he heard him acknowledge it before the judge, he should testify, because the possibility that the person against whom the testimony was given has since been released from the obligation is remote, since the two parties had already come before the judge.

His statement, “Or he attributes it to a cause,” means that the secondary witness hears the original witness testify that so-and-so owes one hundred riyals to so-and-so as the price of a she-camel. The original witness has thus testified and attributed his testimony to a cause—namely, the purchase price of the she-camel. He may therefore testify, because once he attributed it to a cause, it was established by that cause,