“Whoever produces one man and two women, or one witness together with an oath, in a case requiring qiṣāṣ (retaliation), establishes neither retaliation nor financial liability.” For example, a person produces one man and two women who testify that so-and-so deliberately killed this man. Their testimony is not accepted here, and no financial liability is established, because this falls under the category of qiṣāṣ, in which only the testimony of two men is accepted. Financial compensation is consequential upon qiṣāṣ, since the basic ruling in intentional killing is qiṣāṣ. Thus, if he produces one man and two women regarding a mūḍiḥah—a head or facial wound that exposes the bone, that is, makes it visible—then qiṣāṣ applies to it, since retaliation can be exacted from the offender. Their testimony is therefore not accepted, because a mūḍiḥah entails qiṣāṣ, and qiṣāṣ is not a financial matter.

However, if he produces one man and two women, or one witness together with the claimant’s oath, regarding a dāmighah—a wound that exposes, crushes, and breaks the bone until it reaches the membrane of the brain—then, since no qiṣāṣ applies to it, the testimony is accepted. This is one of the unusual rulings. If you were asked, “Which is more serious: a mūḍiḥah or a maʾmūmah?” the answer would be: a maʾmūmah is more severe. Yet testimony is accepted concerning a maʾmūmah, whereas it is not accepted concerning a mūḍiḥah.

His statement, “If he produces this evidence in a theft case, the property is established but not the amputation”: here the ruling is apportioned. “If he produces this evidence,” that is, one man and two women, or one man together with the claimant’s oath, the property is established but not the amputation. He says, “So-and-so stole one hundred dirhams from me.” We say to him, “Produce the witnesses.” He then brings one man and two women who testify that so-and-so stole one hundred dirhams from him. Theft entails two things: the prescribed punishment, which is the cutting off of the hand,