Thus, regarding the testimony of ascendants for descendants and vice versa, the stronger view is that if the ascendant or descendant is outstanding in uprightness and is not subject to suspicion, his testimony must be accepted once the conditions are fulfilled. This is because there is only the underlying rationale; and when the rationale is absent, the ruling is absent. There is no evidence for rejecting testimony categorically between persons in the direct line of descent.

His statement: “Nor may either spouse testify for the other.” A wife may not testify for her husband, nor may a husband testify for his wife. The husband is an upright man, and the wife is an upright woman, yet we say that such testimony is not accepted because of suspicion: a husband’s testimony for his wife is liable to suspicion, as is a wife’s testimony for her husband. This is generally the case, although it is less prevalent than in the case of ascendants and descendants, for hostility between spouses is more common than hostility between relatives; indeed, it is very common.

Therefore, if either spouse testifies for the other, his or her testimony is not accepted. In this matter, however, we say what we said regarding the first issue—indeed, with even greater reason: if the husband or wife is outstanding in uprightness, the testimony is accepted. Thus, if we know that this man can testify for his wife only to what is true, we accept his testimony for her. Likewise, if we know that this wife can testify for her husband only to what is true, we accept her testimony for him.

Is the default prohibition or non-prohibition? We say: as mentioned previously, the default is non-prohibition, unless there is evidence indicating that a husband’s testimony for his wife, or vice versa, is liable to be other than the truth.

His statement: “either spouse”: is consummation of the marriage a condition, or does this apply even before consummation?