the forty-ninth threw a stone at the fiftieth and split his head open, their testimony is not accepted. They said: This is because a child’s reasoning has not yet fully developed; moreover, he is emotional. It is possible that the forty-eight may boycott the fiftieth—and boycotting among children means that one says, “I am boycotting you,” and then shuns him until he no longer even mentions his name. They may all side with the forty-ninth and testify against him.

Moreover, the apparent meaning of the author’s words is that their testimony is not accepted even if they remain at the very place and have not yet dispersed. For if they disperse, they may be coached and then testify; but even if they have not yet left the place where they witnessed the incident, he likewise says that children’s testimony is not accepted.

Some scholars said instead: Children’s testimony concerning matters that are generally witnessed only by children is accepted, provided that they have not dispersed. What these scholars say is more correct. The jurists, may Allah have mercy on them, likewise stated that in a setting witnessed only by women, the testimony of a single woman is accepted. Thus, if these children were in a place witnessed only by children and have not yet dispersed, why should we not accept their testimony? The possibility that they may have boycotted the person against whom they testify is contrary to the presumption. Were we to act upon such a possibility, then every witness—even an adult—could potentially be an enemy of the person against whom he testifies, and we would say that his testimony is not accepted.

If they disperse, their testimony is not accepted because they may be coached. Yet this too is open to question. It should therefore be said that, even if they disperse, some children possess such intelligence and fear of Allah that they cannot be coached. Thus, if a child is fourteen years old, devout, discerning, and of such integrity that nothing could be laid upon his conscience, then such a child—even if