you she?” She replies, “Yes.” He then asks, “Do you owe So-and-so ten thousand?” She replies, “Yes.” So he says, “I testify that So-and-so, daughter of So-and-so, owes So-and-so ten thousand riyals.” This is not possible, because anyone could bring a veiled woman, say, “This is So-and-so, daughter of So-and-so,” and have you testify concerning her. Thus, he must know the person against whom he is testifying, either by name or by description.

Likewise, with regard to the property, right, or debt to which he testifies—as we have previously discussed concerning claims—he may testify only to what he knows. It is not permissible to testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, nor on the basis of what is most likely; rather, certainty is essential. Thus, if he sees someone fleeing from a house while another person pursues him, saying, “This man stole from me! Stop the thief! Stop the thief!” may he testify that this man is a thief? It is not permissible for you to testify that he committed theft, because you do not know. Perhaps the owner of the house had invited him in, then wanted something from him, but he refused, so the owner threatened to kill him and he fled. Therefore, do not testify that he is a thief. But may you testify to what you saw: that you saw him fleeing while the owner of the house was behind him, crying, “The thief! The thief!”? Yes, this is permissible. The matter is then left to the judge, who may rule according to what the circumstantial evidence indicates.

His statement, “through sight or hearing”: the means of knowledge are five. The author mentioned those that occur most frequently, namely sight and hearing. Three of the senses remain: smell, taste, and touch. Thus, he singled out sight and hearing because they are the predominant means; otherwise, one may testify to what one knows through smell—for example, by testifying that this perfume is pleasant or poor, or that this meat is putrid and spoiled, or not spoiled, for example.