there would not remain sufficient time for his beard to grow fully, then he is not required to testify. But if the case may be delayed, it may be said that he is required to do so.

If a disbeliever is summoned to bear testimony, is he required to do so? The answer is that he is required to do so on account of another person’s right. Are not the rights of one’s neighbor binding upon a disbeliever? Indeed, they are. For example, according to the view of some scholars, he has the right of pre-emption. Thus, if the person requesting the testimony says to him, “Testify; perhaps you will become Muslim,” since if a person undertakes testimony while a disbeliever and gives it while a Muslim, his testimony is accepted—we say: the ruling is based on one’s present state; the future cannot be ruled upon, because it is unknown. Therefore, he cannot be compelled to testify.

Nor may he testify except to what he knows through sight, hearing, or widespread report in matters that cannot be known without it, such as lineage, death, unrestricted ownership, marriage, endowment, and the like. Whoever testifies to a marriage or to any other contract must mention its conditions, ...

His statement, “Nor may he testify except to what he knows,” is connected to his statement, “concealing it”; that is, it is not lawful for a person to testify except to what he knows. Knowledge is to perceive a thing as it truly is with certainty. Thus, he must have certain knowledge of that concerning which, or to which, he testifies.

His statement, “except to what he knows,” also means: for whom he knows, and against whom he knows. What he knows is the subject of the testimony; for whom he knows is the beneficiary of the testimony, namely, the claimant; and against whom he knows is the person against whom the testimony is given, namely, the defendant. Is knowledge of the claimant required or not? Suppose that someone testifies to something he knows, then the claimant dies and his heirs bring the claim, saying, “You are testifying for our deceased predecessor.” He replies, “I do not know your predecessor, nor do I know whether you are his heirs or not. But I testify for a person with such-and-such characteristics.” The testimony is then valid. We say: this is knowledge by description, not by personal identity.

Knowledge of the person against whom one testifies is required, either by his name or by a description, if the witness can see him. But it is not sufficient simply to say to him, for example, “Testify regarding a veiled woman,” then bring a woman and say, “This is So-and-so, daughter of So-and-so,” and for him to ask her, “Are