the mosque, there is no objection, because this is not a sale; rather, it is the separation of each person’s share from the other’s. It is also permissible to divide the meat of sacrificial animals and sacrificial offerings, even though selling the meat of sacrificial animals and sacrificial offerings is not permissible. Division is permissible here, however, because it is not a sale.

His words, “The partners may divide it among themselves”: this is subject to the condition that they possess knowledge of how to divide, so that it does not resemble gambling. For if they did not know how to divide, it would be quite possible that they jointly owned land in equal halves, yet divided it into thirds because they did not know how to make the division. Then, when they draw lots to distinguish the respective shares, one of them will either gain or lose: if he receives two thirds, he has gained; and if he receives one third, he has lost.

If they say, “We are both content with this,” we say: this is not permissible, even if you are both content with it. Those competing in a contest in which prizes are not permitted likewise say, “We are mutually content,” and parties engaging in an usurious sale say, “We are mutually content.” Our consent cannot conflict with what the Sacred Law approves; rather, it must conform to it.

His words, “or appoint a person to divide it,” mean that they may also divide it by means of a divider whom they appoint.

His words, “or ask the judge to appoint one”: there is a grammatical error in the author’s wording, “ask,” in that the final nūn has been omitted without cause, since it is an adjective qualifying “a divider.” The intended wording is: “or by a divider whom they ask the judge to appoint.”