with judicial procedure are not all equally relevant; therefore, they placed it here.

Thus, the connection is that partition among co-owners resembles judicial adjudication between two litigants, for the matter between them is decided and each person’s right is distinguished from that of the other. Moreover, if it is carried out by a divider appointed by them both, it resembles the case of a man appointed as arbitrator by two litigants; and if it is carried out by a divider appointed by the judge, then it is connected to judicial procedure.

The author says: Partition falls into two categories:

The first is consensual partition: a partition that is not effective unless all the partners agree to it.

The second is compulsory partition: a partition for which mutual consent is not stipulated; rather, any partner who refuses is compelled.

The author begins with consensual partition, saying:

“Partition of property that cannot be divided except with detriment or upon payment of compensation is not permissible without the consent of the partners.” This is the criterion for what you have classified as consensual partition. Thus, any property jointly owned by two or more persons that cannot be divided except with detriment or upon payment of compensation is not effective unless all the partners consent. This is because, where there is detriment, no one may be subjected to it unless he himself agrees to bear that detriment, being a sane, adult, and legally competent person. And because, if compensation must be paid, it becomes akin to a sale, since it involves consideration and an item given in exchange; and a sale necessarily requires mutual consent.

If someone were to ask: What is the detriment? Is it physical harm or financial loss? The jurists differed concerning the detriment that prevents partition. Some said: