between them, for this is a judicial setting in which all those against whom—or for whom—judgment is to be rendered are equal. Thus, he must deal justly between the two litigants, whatever their respective religions may be.

His statement, “in his glance”: that is, he must treat them equally in looking at them. He must not look at one with a look of approval and at the other with a look of anger; rather, he must look at them both in the same manner, whether the situation calls for a look of anger or a look of approval. What matters is that his manner of looking at the two litigants should not differ.

His statement, “and in his speech”: likewise, he must be just in his speech. He must not speak gently to one of them and harshly to the other. Thus, he should not say to one of them, when he offers greetings, “Welcome; and peace be upon you. How are your children and family?” or the like, while, when the other offers greetings, he merely replies, “And peace be upon you,” in a voice that can barely be heard, or responds with annoyance, and the like. This is not permissible.

Likewise, he may not show special warmth toward one of them by asking about his family background, children, and wealth while not asking the other, even if that litigant is a relative whom he has not seen for a long time. This is not permissible, because he can ask him elsewhere. Here, however, all people are equal; it is not permissible for him to give one of them preference over the other in speech. Similarly, he must treat them equally even in his tone of voice: he must not speak to one gently and mildly, and to the other roughly and harshly. Rather, he must be just in his speech with respect to the number of words, the manner of expression, and the tone of voice.

But if one of the litigants behaves improperly in the court session—