the opinions and select the stronger one. As for the mere follower, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr said: “By the consensus of the scholars, he is not among the scholars.” He spoke truly, for Allah says:
“So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know.” [al-Anbiyāʾ 21:7]
Whoever needs to refer back to someone else is not among the people of knowledge, nor is he among the learned. Accordingly, we say: it is a condition for a judge that he be capable of independent legal reasoning.
As for the mere follower, he has no place in the judiciary, and it is not permissible for him to be appointed as a judge, just as it is not permissible for him to issue legal rulings. If he wishes to give an answer and necessity requires that he be asked, he should say: “Imam Ahmad said,” or “the author of al-Kāfī said,” or “the author of al-Iqnāʿ said,” attributing the statement to the one who made it. This is like an ordinary person who hears one of the scholars say something: he does not issue a legal ruling on that basis; rather, he says, “Such-and-such scholar said such-and-such,” because he has not attained the level at which he may issue a ruling from himself. Instead, he attributes the statement to its author—just as a Companion would say, “I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, say such-and-such,” thereby attributing the hadith to the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him.
Regarding this final condition—independent legal reasoning, even within a school—we say that it is a condition, but subject to what is possible. If we find no one but a judge who is a mere follower, then he is better than a complete layman, for the complete layman neither benefits himself with anything nor benefits others, whereas the follower relies upon some of the books of the school he follows and thus possesses some knowledge. However, one capable of independent legal reasoning from the texts takes precedence over one capable of independent legal reasoning regarding the statements of the imams.
Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said: “These conditions are to be considered according to what is possible, and the appointment of the most suitable, then the next most suitable, is obligatory.” This is indicated by