the spoken words, while this one translates the gestures; there is no difference between them. Thus, we say that making it a condition that the judge be able to speak is open to question. A mute person may be appointed, provided that his gestures are understood or his writing can be read. If either of these is present, he may validly serve as a judge.
The tenth condition is his statement: “a jurist capable of independent legal reasoning, even within his own school.” The judge must necessarily be capable of independent legal reasoning, which is of two types:
The first is unrestricted independent legal reasoning: examining the views of all the scholars, comparing these views with the revealed texts, and selecting what is correct.
The second is independent legal reasoning within a school of law. Such a person does not depart from his school or examine views outside it, but within the school he is capable of independent legal reasoning: he compares the various opinions, refers them to the Quran and the sunnah, and knows the stronger view from the weaker one. Indeed, the apparent meaning of their words is that if he knows the stronger view from the weaker one—even by considering the statements of the jurists of the school—he is called one capable of independent legal reasoning within his school. Thus, the jurist capable of independent legal reasoning within his school is either one who refers the opinions of the school’s scholars to the Quran and the sunnah and identifies the stronger view, or one who refers the opinions of the school’s scholars to the leading authorities of the school, considers the position adopted by those authorities, and chooses it.
His statement, “a jurist capable of independent legal reasoning,” excludes the mere follower who never exercises independent legal reasoning. For example, he takes al-Rawḍ al-Murbiʿ, Muntahā al-Irādāt, or al-Iqnāʿ and simply follows it, without examining or comparing the opinions. Such a person cannot validly serve as a judge, because he is an uncritical follower, not one capable of independent legal reasoning; thus, he does not compare between