“I owe him ten thousand riyals.” The judge would then rule accordingly. For this reason, they said that he cannot distinguish the claimant from the defendant, and that voices may become confused to him; thus, he may rule in favor of one who has no right because of this.

Yet this reasoning is actually unsound, for we observe that a blind person perceives through his sense of hearing more than a sighted person does through his hearing. His auditory perception is powerful, and he recognizes voices. As for knowing who is the claimant and who is the defendant, this is something everyone can determine: the claimant is the one who, if he remains silent, is left alone; whereas the defendant, if he remains silent, is not left alone. The correct view, therefore, is that sight is not a condition, and that a blind person may validly serve as a judge. Of course, a sighted person is more complete; but to make sight a condition such that, if we find no one but a blind man, we do not appoint him—that is incorrect.

The ninth condition is his statement: “able to speak.” For if a mute person were a judge, how would he communicate with the two litigants? He must be able to speak, they say, because the matter requires an intelligible verbal statement. A gesture may be understood, or it may not be understood. But if he can write, then in reality the impediment is removed, because writing expresses what is in the heart just as the tongue expresses what is in the heart. If he is able to write, there is no doubt that he may serve as a judge. It is true that speech is quicker than writing; yet if we find this man qualified for the judiciary, with speech being his only deficiency, we cannot bar him from serving as a judge merely because he cannot speak. Rather, we say: he may write and gesture. A person who regularly accompanies someone knows his gestures just as he knows his speech with his tongue. Thus, someone familiar with his gestures, if he is beside the judge, serves like an interpreter for him; the interpreter translates